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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper discusses the theory of financial regulation and practices in countries and South Africa 
in particular. One of the causes of the global financial crisis (2007-2009) often cited is inadequate 
or improper regulation and supervision of the financial sector. The global financial crisis 
revealed inadequacies of extant regulatory systems which arguably had not kept pace with 
financial innovation. Consequently, all major economies are reforming their regulatory systems in 
the aftermath.  In the UK the Financial Services Authority (FSA) has devised a set of banking 
regulation while the USA enacted the Dodd-Frank Act to revamp the regulation of financial 
services. Historically, financial regulation and supervision has been premised on the silo 
(institutional) approach whereby institutions are regulated according to functional lines. 
However, in the past two decades many countries in advanced economies adopted a consolidated 
approach in response to the emergence of financial conglomerates whose regulation could not be 
adequately handled by the traditional silo approach. South Africa, a middle-income developing 
country, has had a regulatory and supervisory system that has been driven by the market and 
international trends. Having started as a institutional approach, it metamorphosed into a 
functional approach in the late 1980s. Since the 1990s the South African regulatory and 
supervisory system has had at its heart the central bank regulating the banking sector and a multi-
sector regulatory approach for other non-banking financial services. Though the financial sector 
was largely unscathed by the global financial crisis, South Africa has also moved to reform its 
regulatory system to embrace the “twin peak” model in line with trends in related countries.  
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1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND  
 
he terms regulation and supervision denote respectively the establishment of rules relating to a 
particular industry and the monitoring and enforcement thereof. Broadly, the objectives of financial 
regulation cited in the literature are four-fold, viz.: (1) to protect consumers or investors; (2) to 
ensure the solvency and financial soundness of financial institutions; (3) to promote fairness, efficiency and 
transparency in the securities markets; and (4) to promote a stable financial system. According to Goodhart et al. 
(1998) the important role played by the financial system dictates that financial institutions need to be regulated for 
three main reasons, viz: consumer protection, stability of the financial system, and maximizing efficiency. 
 
While the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 has heightened the debate on financial regulation, the debate 
had already been ongoing well before the onset of crisis. Traditionally, a silo or institutional approach to financial 
regulation has been applied. This is a system whereby the three broad financial sectors –banking, insurance and 
securities sectors- have been regulated separately. The financial sector has however continuously evolved to 
challenge the traditional approach. Globalization has brought about financial market integration. Financial markets 
have grown more integrated and complex increasing the risk of financial contagion during crises. The nature of 
financial intermediation has changed and we have witnessed the rise of hedge funds and private equity funds that 
until recently have operated informally and outside the traditional regulatory framework. New financial instruments 
and exotic derivatives have emerged as a result of financial innovation and engineering. For instance, there is 
proliferation of over-the-counter financial instruments such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) whose risks 
T 
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regulators have not yet fully comprehended. Competition in the financial sector has resulted in dominance by a 
small number of huge institutions and has created financial conglomerates which in turn have resulted in regulatory 
arbitrage (Davies and Green, 2008). 
 
Goodhart et al (1998: 143) observe that the emergence of financial conglomerates has posed a challenge to 
the traditional demarcations between regulatory agencies as espoused by the silo approach. Policy makers have 
pondered on how best to regulate innovation and financial conglomerates. When the Labour Government came into 
power in the UK in May 1997, they advocated for centralization of financial regulation and this led to consolidation 
of regulatory and supervisory powers in the Financial Services Authority (FSA). In contrast US bank regulation is 
highly fragmented and allowed for regulatory competition. Masciandaro and Quintyn (2009) observe that the 
shortcomings of the US regulatory structure were evident before the global financial crisis and that the crisis only 
exposed the failure of the argument for regulatory competition which was the cornerstone for the rationale of the US 
system. 
 
While most countries have moved from the silo based approach to financial regulation, there is no 
agreement on the best regulatory structure a country should adopt. So far, the choices have ranged from (1) a silos 
(institutional) model, (2) unified (integrated) model, (3) peaks model and (4) functional (hybrid) model depending 
on the country’s development of the financial system and circumstances. Each of these models has some weaknesses 
and strengths. It is in this context that this paper examines the strengths and weaknesses of the South African 
regulatory system, comparing it with international practice and identifying reform pathways.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the theory of financial regulation. Section 3 
discusses international financial regulation and supervision practices. Section 4 discusses the South African 
regulatory and supervisory system and section 6 concludes.  
 
2. THE THEORY AND RATIONALE FOR FINANCIAL REGULATION 
 
The economic theory of regulation was first published by Stigler in 1971. The Stigler (1971) theory’s 
crucial element was the integration of the analysis of political behaviour with economic analysis. The evolution of 
the theory has centred on two basic schools of thought, namely, positive theories of regulation and normative 
theories of regulation (see for instance, Joskow and Noll, 1981). 
 
As elucidated in the Body of Knowledge on Infrastructure Regulation
1
, positive theories of regulation 
which include theories of market power, interest group theories and theories of government opportunism attempt to 
explain the need for regulation. Theories of market power and interest group theories endeavour to explain 
stakeholders’ interests in regulation while theories of government opportunism explain why restrictions on 
government discretion need to be regulated in order to facilitate efficient provision of services. According to the 
Body of Knowledge on Infrastructure Regulation, these theories explain that regulation happens because of either of 
the following scenarios: 
 
 Where the government would like to minimize information asymmetries and to align an operator’s interest 
with its interest;  
 Where consumers would like protection from monopoly power where competition does not exist or is not 
effective;  
 Where market operators would like protection from rivals; and 
 Where operators themselves would like protection from government opportunism. 
 
On the other hand, normative theories of regulation postulate that regulators should encourage competition 
where possible. It is argued that through information gathering, regulators should assist in reducing the costs of 
information asymmetries and provide operators with performance improving incentives. 
 
The basic economic rationale for financial regulation is that financial market activity generates externalities 
that are not easily addressed by private agents. The problem is that externalities generate social cost in the event of 
                                                 
1 See http://www.regulationbodyofknowledge.org/ accessed on 10 March 2011. 
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failure, especially when this cost is greater than the private cost and the social cost does not form part of the decision 
making function of the institutions, especially banks.  This behaviour can cause financial institutions to take more 
risks and spend more money as opposed to the social cost being incorporated into the overall pricing of the 
institution. This systematic issue of social cost was traditionally the primary reason of the central function of 
regulation of the banking industry (Falkena et al., 2001:12).  Though there is always a problem in measuring 
externalities, in principle regulatory intervention can only be justified where benefits exceed the costs imposed, but 
costs are usually easier to quantify than the benefits. 
 
Two principal strands to the rationale for regulating financial markets, viz: to mitigate the problem of 
systemic risk and to regulate conduct of business in the financial market. Falkena, et al (2001:2) further assert that 
the main objective of financial regulation is to protect the consumer and achieve a high degree of economic 
efficiency in the market.  The protection of the consumer arises from either the institution failing the client who 
holds funds within it or where the institution’s conduct of business is unsatisfactory.   
 
When financial systems are left to themselves, they have been found to be prone to spells of instability and 
contagion. The World Bank (2001) reports 112 systemic banking crises in 93 countries between the late 1970s and 
the end of the twentieth century. Eichengreen and Bordo (2002) have argued that crises are more prevalent today 
than they were in the pre-1914 era of financial globalization indicating that the incidence of financial crisis has 
tended to rise as financial markets have become more liberalised and globalized.  Falkena et al. (2001:11) observe 
that the three main elements of a financial or banking crisis are: (1) the incentive structures are not motivational; (2) 
the management and control systems within the bank are weak; (3) regulations, monitoring and supervision are of 
poor quality. 
 
Prudential supervision of banks stems from the basis that banks through their role in maturity 
transformation and the provision of liquidity has a special position in the financial system. Being at the centre of the 
payments network, the failure of one bank can bring about a domino effect on others and the resulting potential 
externalities cannot easily be internalized. Banks do not necessarily take account of the potential external cost to the 
economy of their failure and hence they tend to take greater risks than they would do if there was a market for this 
risk. Thus the goal of supervision is to prevent potentially excessive risk taking by requiring banks to hold larger 
reserves than they might otherwise do and to conduct their business with more careful attention to risk (Davies and 
Green, 2008). These arguments tend to be a justification for a lender of last resort role played by central banks. 
However, noting that the existence of a lender of last resort function has a cost, Davies and Green (2008) further 
argue that there should be a clear distinction between providing liquidity support to a fundamentally sound bank and 
providing solvency support but observe that the two are confused in practice. Continuous supervision in the form of 
monitoring the capital reserve position and risk management arrangements of banks is meant to reduce the expected 
cost of the central bank as the lender of last resort. 
 
Regulating conduct of business is justified on the basis that there are information asymmetries in the 
market which a regulatory system can help to reduce. Due to asymmetric information in the financial markets, 
shareholders have less information about the economic conditions of institutions in which they want to invest giving 
rise to adverse selection of investments and moral hazard behaviour by financial institutions (Mishkin, 2004).  
Governments address these issues of adverse selection and moral hazard through regulation that, among other 
things, requires financial institutions to disclose certain information to the public. 
 
3. INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE AND EXPERIENCE 
 
Financial regulation regimes in many countries are generally fragmented. A banking survey conducted by 
the Economist Intelligence Unit (2006) showed that over one-third of banks report to 10 or more regulators and over 
75% of all banks report to four or more regulators. It also showed that only 3% of banks reported to a single 
regulator. A global bank was shown to have more than 350 regulatory exams a year, an indication of the increasing 
complexity of financial markets that is making compliance very burdensome and costly for multinational banks. 
 
In practice, there are essentially four approaches to financial regulation and supervision: the silos 
(institutional) model, the integrated (unified) model, the peaks (horizontal) model and the (functional) hybrid model. 
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The silos model or institutional model is the traditional approach that appropriates financial regulation according to 
main functional lines –banking, insurance and securities industry. In other words, it follows the boundaries of the 
financial system in different sectors, and where every sector is supervised by a different agency. The central bank is 
usually assigned the responsibility for prudential and systemic regulation of the banking sector. The regulation of the 
conduct of business in the sector is partially done through self-regulation whereby a council or a committee selected 
by the regulators and industry players is assigned.  
 
Typically, financial institutions have also tended to address compliance with a silos approach. Compliance 
and risk activities are often carried out by different departments using different information sets. This has resulted in 
financial institutions managing governance, risk and compliance in an uncoordinated manner despite risks having 
become interdependent and the need for controls to be shared across the entire organization. Such parallel 
compliance and risk activities have increased the cost of compliance (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006).  
 
The silos model has a number of shortcomings, especially with regard to regulating financial conglomerates 
which are now a common feature of financial institutions. Typically, the model introduces inconsistency when a 
financial conglomerate or group operates in the three main industries of the sector, viz.: banking, insurance and 
securities sectors.  Such a financial group would then be required to be regulated by three different regulators. This 
provides space for regulatory arbitrage whereby tighter regulation in one sector is compensated by moving 
operations to sectors where regulation is not too tight. A financial group would for example reduce the required 
aggregate capital in the banking sector by spreading risks to the securities and/or insurance sectors where capital 
requirements are generally lower. The second problem is that each sector by virtue of having a different regulator 
may be viewed as a separate entity from the holding company. As a result, the risk assumed by a financial group 
could end up being larger or smaller than the sum of the risk of its subsidiaries depending on whether all are 
regulated or not. However, the less regulated subsidiaries of a financial group could pose instability to the entire 
group.  
 
In fact the growing importance of financial groups was a factor to the trend to unify regulatory and 
supervisory structures in Europe in the late 1980s. The unified or integrated model is where the financial regulation 
and supervision covering banking, securities and insurance markets is completely integrated. In the integrated model 
there is a single universal regulator that conducts both safety and soundness oversight and conduct of business 
regulation for all the sectors of financial services. Its stated advantage is its “unified focus on regulation and 
supervision without confusion or conflict over jurisdictional lines” inherent under either the silo approach or the 
functional approach (G30 report, 2008: 14). However, its shortcoming is that it could create “the risk of a single 
point of regulatory failure” and presents challenges in coordinating regulators. 
 
In the aftermath of domestic financial crises, Scandinavian countries consolidated their regulatory agencies 
–Norway in 1986, Iceland and Denmark in 1988 and Sweden in 1991. According to Taylor and Fleming (1999), the 
creation of unified regulatory agencies was market-driven and was intended to make regulation effective. In June 
1998 the UK decided to assign the task of regulating and supervising the entire financial system to a single authority 
other than the central bank. The responsibility for banking supervision was transferred from the Bank of England to 
a new body, the Financial Services Authority (FSA). On the backdrop of the UK move to unified system, more 
countries followed suit as cited by Masciandaro and Quintyn (2009).  Austria [2002], Belgium [2004] and Germany 
[2002] also assigned the role of supervising the entire financial system to a single authority other than the central 
bank. In contrast, supervisory responsibilities were concentrated in the central bank in Ireland [2003] and the Czech 
and Slovak Republic [2006]. New entrants to the EU that have embraced a single authority are Estonia [1999], 
Latvia [1998], Malta [2002], Hungary [2000] and Poland [2006], and outside Europe the unified model has been 
established in Kazakhstan, Korea, Japan and Nicaragua (Masciandaro and Quintyn, 2009). 
 
The twin peaks (horizontal) model is premised on the differences among public goals of regulation and 
assigns a different regulatory authority to every goal (Taylor, 1995). It is defined by the G30 report (2008) as a form 
of regulation by objective, one in which there is a separation of regulatory functions between two regulators 
whereby one performs the safety and soundness supervision function while the other focuses on conduct of business 
regulation.  It is an approach designed to incorporate the efficiencies and benefits from the intergraded approach but 
also to make provision for conflict that may exist between consumer protection and transparency and the safety and 
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soundness of regulation objectives.  Australia and the Netherlands are some of the few countries that make use of 
the twin peak approach and its merits have been debated by countries such as France, Italy, Spain and the United 
States (G30 report, 2008). 
 
The functional or hybrid model as implemented by Italy and France is not based on the legal status of a 
business but rather on the type of business being performed by the entity to be regulated without regard to its legal 
status (G30 report, 2008). Each type of business may be assigned its own functional regulator. This model works 
well if coordination between the agencies can be maintained, but can pose a difficulty in determining the type of 
activity of the business to be subjected to regulation. The US financial system is best described purely hybrid in the 
sense that it has both functional and institutional aspects but with the added complexity of a number of state-level 
agencies and actors (G30 report, 2008). The 2007- 2009 global financial crisis exposed the weaknesses of the system 
and the US Treasury “Blueprint of a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure” mooted in March 2008 advocated 
for a modified twin peaks approach as a long-term goal. However, in the US historical precedent, politics, and 
culture play an important role in the design of the regulatory structure as evidenced by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
and Consumer Protection Act enacted in July 2010 that revamped the regulation of financial services. The main 
element of the Act was the creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to serve as an early-
warning system to identify risks in forms and market activities, to enhance oversight of the financial system as a 
whole and to harmonize prudential standards across agencies. 
 
According to Masciandaro and Quintyn (2009), before the widespread reforms of the 2000s the distribution 
of the models of financial regulation and supervision in a sample of 102 advanced countries comprised: 35%  of 
sampled countries followed the silos (institutional) model; 24% followed the unified (integrated) model; 2% 
followed the twin peaks model (notably Australia and the Netherlands) and 39% followed the hybrid (functional) 
model, notably in the US, France and Italy where the structure of the regulation and supervision can be explained 
from history or the political economy. Following the reforms implemented in the period 1988-2008, 30% of the 
sample had adopted the unified model, 33% the silos model, 33% the hybrid model and 4% the twin peaks model. 
Some systems may not neatly follow this delineation but they still have elements of these four approaches.  Table 1 
shows an overview of the regulatory structures of selected countries worldwide. 
 
 
Table 1:  Regulatory Structures of Selected Countries 
Type of regulation Determining feature Countries 
Silo (institutional) approach The legal structure of the firm 
determines the overseeing regulator 
China, Hong Kong, Mexico 
Integrated (unified) approach Single regulator regulates all financial 
sectors 
Canada, Germany, UK, Norway, 
Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, Japan, 
Qatar, Singapore 
Functional (hybrid) approach Supervisor oversight are determined by 
the business of the firm 
US, France, Italy. Brazil, Spain 
Twin peak approach Regulation determined by objective. Australia, Netherlands 
Source: G30 Report (2008) 
 
 
4. THE SOUTH AFRICAN FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM 
 
The importance of the financial sector in the economy of South Africa is best understood by having 
reference to Table 2 below. Its share of GDP is10.5% and financial sector assets are well over 200% of GDP. 
 
The financial services sector of South Africa is well-developed just like those in advanced economies such that 
regulatory issues are as equally important to warrant the attention of authorities both nationally and internationally. 
Internationally, South Africa is a member of G-20 countries and member of the Bank of International Settlements 
and has one seat on the Financial Stability Board that coordinates regulation at the international level. Its central 
bank is one of those that take active participation in Basel accords and compliance. The report by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) published in October 2008 observes that South Africa has a well diversified and refined 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – November 2011 Volume 10, Number 11 
32 © 2011 The Clute Institute 
financial system, which is supported by an “effective regulatory framework” as well as a developed financial and 
legal infrastructure. 
 
 
Table 2: Snapshot of the Financial Services Sector of South Africa in 2010 
Component Description Share of GDP 
Size (gross value added) 10.5% 
Assets 
Of which: 
          Banks 
          Long term insurers 
          Short term insurers 
          Pension funds (public and private) 
252% 
 
127% 
60% 
4% 
62% 
 
Employment 
Share of formal employment 
3.9% 
 
Tax contribution 
Share of corporate taxes 
15.3% 
Source: South Africa National Treasury Policy Document (2011) 
 
 
 
Prior the 1980s the South African regulatory structure sluggishly followed international trends whereby 
regulators rarely looked beyond the national borders. Capital requirements were based on simple ratios of capital to 
total assets. Off-balance sheet activities and derivatives were unregulated. Consolidated supervision was an 
unknown concept and the financial sector components –banks, insurance and the capital markets –were regarded as 
separate entities nationally and regulated separately. In other words, a silo or institutional approach was in place. 
Supervisory co-operation at an international level was still a mooted idea (Cooke, 1999). Owing to political isolation 
of South Africa during the 1980s due to the country’s apartheid policies, co-operation with foreign regulators was 
almost non-existent. As a result the regulatory regime progressively became out of line with international best 
standards. 
 
Between 1965 and 1980 the financial sector was heavily regulated. Deregulation only started to happen in 
the late 1980s following the commissioning of the De Kock Commission by the government in 1987. The De Kock 
Commission observed that institutional regulation had resulted in over-regulation in the banking sector making the 
sector inefficient and not competitive and recommended functional regulation (regulating specific activities) and 
risk-weighted equity rules. These recommendations were implemented through the Banking Act of 1990 that was 
based on first world criteria and principles (Basel rules) that focused on risk management and the regulatory 
structure became partially integrated with the central bank regulating the banking sector and a multi-sector 
regulatory approach for other non-banking financial services.  In 1993 another government-sponsored commission, 
the Melamet Commission, recommended that South Africa adopt the unified regulatory approach to be in line with 
developments in European countries whose financial systems are similar.  However, the regulatory system has 
remained functional and partially integrated to the present day. Figure 1 depicts a structure with two main regulatory 
authorities namely, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) and the Financial Services Board (FSB).   The deposit-
taking banking sector is regulated by the Banking Supervision Department of the SARB while non-banking financial 
institutions are regulated by the FSB independently from, but accountable to the National Treasury. Regulatory 
duties and powers for some industries are split horizontally. The Registrar of Companies which is in the Department 
of Trade and Industry and the Registrar of Medical Schemes in the Department of Health regulates medical 
schemes. Furthermore, the regulation of some functions is delegated to self-regulatory organizations or associations. 
For instance, the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) and the central securities depository operate, STRATE 
Ltd, as self-regulatory organizations. The credit industry is regulated by the National Credit Regulator whose 
objective is to promote fairness in accessing consumer credit, consumer protection and competitiveness in the credit 
industry (van Zyl et al., 2009).  
 
Essentially, the South African regulatory and supervisory system has a number of disparate regulators 
coordinated through statutory bodies, advisory bodies and standing committees. It is best described as functional and 
split horizontally. It presently does not have an overarching coordinating authority. 
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Figure 1:  Present Regulatory Landscape in South Africa 
Source: National Treasury Policy Document, 2011. 
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In 2008 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank performed a Financial Sector 
Assessment Program (FSAP) whereby they conducted a joint assessment of the South African financial system. The 
main outcome from the IMF team was that although South Africa had a modern and effective financial regulatory 
framework, it nevertheless needed reform that prioritize and strengthen both prudential and market conduct 
supervision and regulatory powers (IMF Country Report, 2008). The IMF also observed that due to the 
implementation of the National Credit Act in 2005, South Africa has made strides in the improvement of consumer 
protection leading to the decrease in reckless lending practices. 
 
In an effort to address shortcomings in the regulatory structure identified by the IMF, the Government 
issued the National Treasury Policy Document in February 2011 that set out proposals for strengthening the 
financial regulatory system. The main policy thrust was the adoption of the twin-peak model of financial regulation 
in South Africa. It was in part recognition that the country’s system of financial regulation was historically linked to 
the UK and former British colonies, especially Australia and Canada, whose regulatory systems had since been 
reformed before the global financial crisis. The UK had opted for an integrated system in the 1990s whereby the 
Financial Services Authority became responsible for regulating all financial services. Australia had adopted the 
twin-peak model. However, after the global financial crisis there was a global shift away from the integrated (single-
regulator) model towards the twin-peak model. South Africa which incidentally was contemplating adopting a 
single-regulator model from the recommendation of the 1993 Melamet Commission decided to move in line with 
international trends. Given its current regulatory structure, the adoption of the twin-peaks model was considered to 
cause the least amount disruption to both market participants and the current regulators. Furthermore, given the 
country’s historical neglect of market conduct regulation, the twin-peaks model was seen as the optimal means of 
giving sufficient priority to transparency, market integrity and consumer protection. 
 
The main elements of South Africa’s proposed twin-peak model are diagrammatically shown in Figure 2 
below. 
 
Figure 2: South Africa’s proposed Twin-Peak Model 
Note: Dotted lines indicate a cooperative relationship. 
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South Africa’s twin-peak model will be underpinned by three pillars – coordination, prudential regulation 
and market conduct of business. The Council of Financial Regulators comprising heads of key financial regulators, 
non-financial regulators and other stakeholders will ensure overall coordination of financial regulation. It will also 
serve as a formal channel for resolving conflicts that inevitably arise from separating prudential and market conduct 
regulation. The Financial Stability Oversight Committee comprising the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), the 
Financial Services Board (FSB) and National Treasury will coordinate financial stability issues and endeavour to 
mitigate risks. The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) will be responsible for prudential regulation while the 
Financial Service Board (FSB) will regulate the conduct of business. 
 
Cognizant of the complexities of the twin-peak approach, South Africa intends to phase in the system over 
a three year period. It is a realization that the approach requires different skill sets for prudential and market conduct 
regulation and a transition period would minimize the risk of weakening the capacity of existing regulators. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The South African financial regulatory and supervisory system has historically evolved through almost all 
the stages of the extant regulatory structures. Having started as an institutional approach, it metamorphosed into a 
functional approach in the late 1980s. In the 1990s the regulatory structure transformed itself into a partially 
integrated system whose main tenet entailed the central bank regulating the banking sector and a multi-sector 
regulatory approach for other non-banking financial services. The evolution of the South African regulatory 
structure has been largely driven by international trends and market imperatives. 
 
While authorities were contemplating adopting the integrated approach which had become fashionable 
since the 1990s, the global financial crisis struck in 2007 and exposed the weaknesses of the approach. The G30 
report (2008) had however indicated that the integrated and twin peak models had been viewed as more efficient and 
cost-effective not only by regulators but also by the entities. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the twin-
peak model was viewed to be the most superior model among the alternatives so that advanced countries started in 
earnest to debate its merits. In line with these international trends, South Africa is in the process of changing its 
regulatory structure from the partly integrated functional approach to the twin peak regulatory approach. With the 
twin peak approach South Africa will have a separate regulator for prudential regulation and market conduct 
regulation.  It is hoped the system will increase the coordination and flow of information between the different 
entities in the financial market and therefore creating better risk management structures which are the main goal of 
supervision. 
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